12/7/20

Consumer price index for energy revisited - energy will be cheap in relative terms till 2030

 In one of our recent posts, we analyzed the difference between the headline and core CPI and reported that the latter has been growing faster than the former one since 2010-2012. This means that food and energy currently have lower price-setting power than all other ingredients of the headline CPI. As a result, we move through the era of low energy prices in the next decade, as the projected trend in the headline and core CPI shows. In this post, we analyze the difference between the core CPI and energy price index (food price index might introduce some bias in the estimation of the energy price evolution), both time series are borrowed from the BLS.  As a template for this post, we use our previous post devoted to the same topic and published 4 years ago. It allows to trace the evolution of the difference between the core CPI and energy price index during the last 4 years and compare it with the predictions made 4 and 12 years ago. We have been studying the long-term evolution of energy prices in the USA since 2007 and reported several important observations useful for profitable and safe investments. The simplest fact we have discussed is the effect of energy/oil price on stock prices. The share price of Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips does depend on the oil price. The link is direct and positive – the oil price increase is reflected in share price growth. We have calculated regression coefficients in order to understand which company is most sensitive.

In 2008, we reported that several major categories of consumer prices (various goods and services) have sustainable and quasi-linear in time trends relative to energy prices. Similar behavior was reported for producer prices and oil. One can easily assess the opportunity for sound investments from the accuracy of our predictions. Moreover, our observations demonstrated that many of these sustainable trends have clear turning points which provide investors with invaluable information on effective buy/sell decisions.

Our theoretical approach was first published more than twelve years ago in a paper on the presence of long-term sustainable trends in the differences between various components of the CPI in the USA. We started with the difference between the core CPI (i.e., the headline CPI less food and energy) and the CPI. Then the consumer price index of energy, which gave approximately 9% of the CPI, was analyzed. In the beginning of 2008, we successfully identified and predicted that the difference between the CPI and the energy index was approaching a turning point (actually observed in the summer of 2008) and forecasted the energy prices to fall relative to the core CPI through the first half of the 2010s. Based on the general approach, we also estimated that after the turning point in 2008/2009 oil prices would go down from $100 to $50 per barrel in 2015 and $30-60 in 2016. As one may know this prediction of the turning point timing and the level of oil price and the duration of higher oil prices is accurate.  

Here we revisit the relative evolution of the core consumer price index (CPI) and the CPI of energy and add data for the period between 2015 and November 2020. Figure 1 displays two panels for the difference between the core CPI and the index for energy: for the period between 1960 and 2014, and the same variable up to November 2020. All CPIs are seasonally adjusted and borrowed from the BLS.  Before 1980, these two indices had been growing almost in sync with fluctuation around 10 units of the price index. Between 1981 and 1999, the difference grew from -10 to almost 80 units. Between 2001 and 2008, a period of intensive growth in the energy index was observed. Qualitatively, one can distinguish three periods of a linear trend and three turning periods with a higher volatility. The last turning point was in 2008 and the index of energy is now on a long-term decline relative to the core CPI.  The extremely high volatility (the change in trend is a fight of many forces) masked the new trend in the difference before 2011. Currently, the new trend is well in the middle and shows the expected behavior - energy price goes down. The question is - when will it reach its bottom? And when the price will reach the hard bottom? Twelve years ago we expected that oil price might go down to $22. Is this the case now? Yes, it was very low (negative) at the beginning of 2020 and at a low level now.




Figure 1. The difference between the core CPI and the index for energy between the upper panel - 1960 to 2015; lower panel - 1960 to 2020. There are three clear periods of a linear trend and three turning periods. The most recent turning point was in 2008 and the new trend emerged more of less clearly in 2011. Currently, this trend is stable and likely will last another decade.
 

Figure 2 has two panels illustrating the predicted behavior from 2014 to the most recent period. Since 2001, we observe a slow decrease in energy price relative to the core CPI. Their difference in Figure 2 is below the green line representing the predicted trend for the period after 2010 - the slope is as between 2001 and 2008 but with an opposite sign. Since summer 2014, the energy index has been falling much faster than before and the (green line) trend was intercepted in November 2014. Linear regression gives a slope of +6 for the difference curve since 2011 which is still much lower than the absolute value of the slope between 2001 and 2008 (-14). The energy price had extremely high volatility between 2005 and 2011. Then the price calmed down and demonstrated only short term and low amplitude fluctuations. The level of volatility is again high since summer 2015. One might expect a few years of larger volatility from deep falls to sky heights.

Data between 2001 and 2015 give a clear indication of the new trend direction and slope. Following this trend, we predicted that the difference of core CPI and consumer price index of energy would likely reach its peak value in 2016-2018. We expect no further decrease in oil price beyond 2018. The question is when the trend will change to the opposite like that was observed in 2001 and 2010? Historic evidence is unbreakable – cycles rule this world. There are many explanations of the current energy price behavior. Various actors are suggested as drivers with their own motives open and hidden. We do not consider them as wise and explanatory. To say “cycle” does not mean to explain something as well. This is just a set of observations in favor of future evolution. In any case, the trend predicted in 2007 and confirmed in 2015  has been evolving according to the expected trajectory.

 


Figure 2. Upper panel: same as in Figure 1, for the period after 2002. Linear trends are marked. Lower panel. The predicted trend (solid green line) in fully confirmed by new data since 2015 ( a regression line with a slope of  ~10.4 is calculated). The evolution follows the same trend as described in 2007. 

We used only absolute difference CPI so far. Since consumer price indices grow or fall with time, i.e. change their levels, it is also instructive to analyze the same differences in relative terms. We have normalized the studied difference to the core CPI. Figure 3 illustrates the new pattern. In contrast to Figure 1, the amplitudes and periods of long-term fluctuations are similar and the overall evolution seems to be repeatable, i.e. cyclic. Figure 4 exercises the assumption of repeatability. We have shifted the original curve by 27 years ahead and obtained a striking similarity in the amplitude and timing of the energy price falls and rises. This feature is attributed to the cyclic evolution of prices in relative terms, i.e. the relative price-setting power of various goods and services in the CPI. The previous period of lowering energy prices was between 1980 and 2000, i.e. lasted 20 years. The trend of the same duration extends into the 2020s and likely will finish in 2030. At least the first half of this period of low energy prices is over, but the energy prices may fall further relative to the weighted prices included in the core CPI.

Finally, Figure 5 shows a detailed picture that could be helpful in the energy price estimation. The upper panel in Figure 5 presents the difference observed in 2015. We predicted that the black curve reaches the red line in 2016. This dramatic drop was really observed, and our 2012 forecast that the energy price has to plummet in the first half of the 2010s was successful. In 2015 we expected that "When the black line touches the red one - the energy index returns to the long term sustainable trend stretching into the 2020s. The era of low energy prices has come and the trend will not change to the opposite before, say, 2025."  This prediction is still accurate and the black line follows up the red line, i.e. the history of energy price is cyclic and thus repeatable.

 

Figure 3. The difference between the core and energy CPIs normalized to the core CPI.


Figure 4. Same as in Figure 3 with red curve representing the original (black) curve shifted 27 years ahead




Figure 5. Upper panel: in 2015 we wrote-  "An energy cliff is not over". This was correct as the lower panel shows.
 

We formulate three general conclusions:

 

-The era of low energy price will extend into the 2020s.

- The energy price may fall  to $20 by 2030.

- The change in energy price will be characterized by an elevated level of volatility in the next five to ten years.

12/5/20

Revisited CPI data confirm our prediction - energy prices will not be growing faster than other goods and services in the next ten years

 Economic variables measured by economic agencies and institutions present a unique source of valuable information for a scientist with a background in physics. Instead of building thought experiments based on shaky assumptions, as economists usually do, physicists first look into the data and try to find regular behavior, which can be described by simple functions/equations. Such regular behavior allows predicting the future behavior of economic (and physical) variables, and this is what we do in hard sciences.  The evolution of the consumer price index (CPI) in the USA is one of such variables we study since the mid-2000s. In 2008, we published a paper on the presence of long-term sustainable trends in the differences between various components of the CPI in the USA.

We started with the difference between the core CPI (i.e. CPI less food and energy) and the overall CPI. In this post, we revise the previous observations and add data for the last 4 years (our previous post on this issue was published on December 25, 2016. First, we repeat two Figures (1 and 2) from the previous post, which are borrowed from the aforementioned paper:

Figure 1. Linear regression of the difference between the core CPI and CPI for the period from 1981 to 1999.  The goodness-of-fit is 0.96, and the slope is 0.67.

Figure 2. Linear regression of the difference between the core CPI and CPI after 2002.  The goodness-of-fit is 0.86, and the tangent is -1.57.  Elevated volatility has been observed since 2005.

In this twelve-year-old paper as well as in later papers on the sustainable trends in the CPI and PPI (see here), we suggested that the negative trend shown in Figure 2 should reach some bottom point and then turn to a positive trend. It was also mentioned that such processes in the past had been accompanied by an elevated volatility in the difference, i.e. high amplitude fluctuations.

Eight  years after the 2008 prediction, we confirmed and reported that the initial predictions were accurate - after reaching the bottom in 2010, the trend turned to a positive one and was likely approaching (in 2016)  the mid-point of the contemporary linear segment. It is important to stress, that from the very beginning, we have been reporting on the evolution of the difference between the headline CPI and core CPI (cCPI, i.e. CPI less food and energy) many times. The 4-year-long gap in reporting is due to lack of time  - analysis of the DPRK nuclear tests and their aftershocks were of the highest priority. At the same time, the 4-year-gap makes it possible to assess the accuracy of the previous predictions without short-term prejudice.

Our concept of cyclic evolution was formulated in 2007. Essentially, this concept says that the future trajectory has to repeat the path observed thirty years ago, i.e. the cycle has a 30 years period. Figure 3 (repeated from the previous post) presents the state of the CPI difference normalized to the headline CPI ( [cCPI-CPI]/CPI ) observed since the late 1950s (dotted red line) and the predicted trajectory (blue dotted line), which is the current curve shifted by 30 years ahead. Figure 4 (also from the previous post) presents corresponding linear trends with all volatile periods removed. The current period between 2010 and 2025-2030 is characterized by faster growth in the prices of all goods and services (cCPI) than the growth of food and energy prices included in the CPI.  

Figure 3. The difference between core (cCPI) and headline (CPI) CPI normalized to CPI. The period of the cycle is 30 years and the dotted blue line presents the future of the normalized difference before 2044.

Figure 4. The current state of our prediction. Redline follows up the blue line.

Twelve years after the first prediction we have to conclude that it was extraordinary by its accuracy - we predicted the era of low energy+food prices (core CPI is the headline CPI less food and energy) since 2014 (the end of the transition to the new positive trend)  and for the following ~20 years. For energy companies, Figure 4 implied that oil/energy prices are on a negative trend until at least 2030.

Figure 5 presents the current state of the cCPI and CPI difference, as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The positive trend formed between  2014 and 2016 is still observed and will likely continue in the 2020s. This observation indicates that there is no reason to expect that food and energy will gain some economic power to push their prices above the overall price of other goods and services. A  figure in the Appendix repeats the old versions of Figure 3 with new data added.

 


Figure 5. Same as in Figure 4 with data between 2016 and 2020. The positive trend formed between  2014 and 2016 is still observed and will\likely continue in the 2020s.

Appendix.



 

 

 

Labor force participation rate in the USA will fall to 59% by 2025-2030. Revision of the 2013 prediction

 Seven years we presented a description of secular fall in the labor force participation rate, LFPR, measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see original prediction in Figure 1). The LFPR (the portion of people in the labor force) for the working-age population (16 years of age and over) has been on a long-term decline since 1995. We predicted the fall down to 59% by 2025. The series of events in 2020 dramatically affected the labor force market in the USA and show that the overall evolution of the LFPR to the predicted level is still accurate. Between 2014 and 2019, the LFPR was hovering around 63% and slightly deviated from the predicted trajectory. Such deviations are not stable, however, and also were observed in the past. The long-term LFPR behavior is close to a sin(t) function. This might be an expression of the oscillating natural process driving the LFPR evolution as described by Russian economist Kondratiev, who introduced long-period (50 to 60 years) waves in economic evolution – see Figure 2. Following Kondratiev, we interpolated the observed LFPR curve by a sinus function with a period of ~70 years. In Figure 3, we added ~50 LFPR readings published since 2016 and show the most recent portion of the curve in Figure 4.

New data fit the predicted curve and allow to make some predictions.  We see that the bottom of the model function is expected in 2030 and the rate is 58.5%. We also observe the development of a new short-term level in the LFPR is expected near 61.5 %. The drop in the LFPR is an irreversible and economic activity in the USA is near the lowermost level. This does not mean, however, that international financial domination of the USA will not feed the US stock market and budget with money. The drop in the LFPR just means that the US labor market is on the degradation trajectory - more and more people will lose jobs before 2030. Actual recovery is possible only after 2040. It is not excluded that the next 20 years is the era of the US (more likely international) financial institutions.

Figure 1. Original prediction of the LFPR evolution in the USA made in the earlier 2010s. The long-term behavior is close to a sin function. This is an expression of the oscillating natural process in the background  of LFPR evolution.


Figure 2. The Kondratiev wave

 

Figure 3. Same as in Figure 1 with 50+ new readings since 2016. The drop in 2020 moves the observation curve down to the predicted one with a weak rebound in the second half of 2020.


Figure 4. The actual LFPR curve (red) and that predicted by sin function since 2000. Development of a new level in the LFPR is expected near 61.5 %.

12/4/20

New labor data indicate that there is no sign of fast economic recovery any time soon

 

1. Good news - the number of unemployed seems to fall and ( with some deceleration ) may reach the pre-crisis level. The number of unemployed may drop when people get jobs or when they leave the labor force, however. 



2. Another good news - the number of employed increases (also with deceleration).  Here we have to retain in mind the permanently (linear) growing working-age population. It increases at a rate of ~2,280,000 per year (between 2010 and 2020). One has to subtract approximately 1,000,000 (population times employment rate)  from the current employment level in the below figure in order to compensate for the expected change in the number of employed. Therefore, the total  increase from 133,400,000 in April to 149,732,000 in November has to be 15.4M instead of 16.4M.



3. The labor force participation rate hovers around 61.5% since June. This is not good news. Considering the potential economic growth there is no prospective - the employed and unemployed population left the labor force and there is no sign of recovery to the pre-crisis level any time soon.



12/3/20

Plague in Vienna , now COVID-19

There is a plague memorial just in the center of Graben - the center of Vienna. It has to remind everyone about the losses 350 years ago. Judging by the behavior of Vienneses and visitors, it does not. The COVID-19 pandemic was considered with a laugh by the younger population and immobilizing fear by political authorities. The former practically ignored social distancing and the latter are still dead scared of any decision - they want to fly between droplets of heavy rain. It does not work, as expected (European politicians is a very specific type of psychic anomaly). The largest number of new COVID-19 cases per day (at the testing rate is about half of that in the USA, UK, and Russia) was ~9,500. When scaled to the US population (330/9 =6.67), this rate is 350,000 per day. This is much much higher than the pick value in the USA. 

Why Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is fading away

 The OSCE is an example opposite to the UNSC. It does not have a veto agreement and many punish minorities. According to the OSCE, the US (the OSCE State Signatory)  elections do not show any problem as such. Frauds and massive manipulation do not affect the OSCE approach to other countries. 

The uneven approach makes the essence of the OSCE void and the organization deserves to be dismissed. I am sure nobody will remember it in a few days after it disappears. Even the current staff memebers. 

Now on arXiv.org "Effects of stochastic and natural seismic noise on the performance of waveform cross-correlation used to recover low-magnitude seismicity prior to the July 29, 2025, Kamchatka earthquake"

arXiv.org link :  [2607.16226] Effects of stochastic and natural seismic noise on the performance of waveform cross-correlation used to reco...