1. None of the countries and none of the agencies published information about explosive signals passing through steel pipes. As we know, if you knock on the heating pipe, then the whole house will immediately know about it and begin to complain about the noise. The same effect would have been caused by an explosion destroying the NS-2 pipe and the NS-1 pipes. But there is no information of this kind, although on the pipes, as on all large engineering structures, sensors must be installed that record elastic loads.
2. The blast wave in water propagates over long distances since water is an incompressible liquid with extremely low absorption of sound waves. The Baltic Sea is shallow, and the bottom is hard. Therefore, the water layer of the sea is a good example of a low-speed channel with a long propagation range. No one claimed to have registered a hydroacoustic signal from the explosion. In conjunction with point 1, the absence of explosive signals in the pipe and water makes it possible to explain the lack of reaction of the NS administration to the first "explosion", which occurred almost exactly 17 hours before the second.
3. Seismic signals are detected at fairly large distances from sources, which indicates their rather high effective power. In this case, the characteristic size of the source is no more than a few tens of meters, which makes its characteristics indistinguishable from a point source. It is not possible to restore the internal structure of the source, that is, the size and temporal function. Any source of small size with a rapid release of energy will look like an explosion. The magnitude of the seismic source of the second event is close to 3, taking into account the standard deviation of the magnitude estimate. Such a magnitude during an explosion in water, which, as incompressible liquid, leads to an increase in the efficiency of the conversion of the explosion energy into the elastic energy of seismic waves up to 5-10% compared to efficiency in hard rocks of the order of 1%, corresponds to an explosion power of TNT from several hundred kg to one two tons. Such an explosion would leave traces on the pipe, and the bottom surface, and would lead to the mass death of fish. Visual observations of damage to the pipe and surface will allow you to accurately assess whether there was an explosion of this magnitude.
4. Observations of an infrasonic signal at a distance of up to 15 degrees suggest the presence of an effective sound source in the atmosphere. Underwater explosions are not an effective source of sound in the atmosphere due to the large impedance difference between the two media. However, the release of gas from a pipe with a pressure of 100 bar (NS-2) and 165 bar (NS-1) (both estimates given by Gazprom) has sufficient volume and pressure to create an effective source of infrasound in the atmosphere. The internal energy of the gas at a pressure of 165 bar in a large-diameter pipe with a length of several hundred meters is tens of tons of TNT, which corresponds to the estimate of the explosion power required to excite infrasound recorded over long distances, taking into account the difference in the efficiency of the explosion and the gas bubble.
5. The instantaneous formation of a large hole in a pipe, regardless of the mechanism, can lead to the formation of a large bubble of gas at elevated pressure, which, escaping to the surface, is a source of infrasound. The release of gas from the pipe creates the effect of a jet engine according to the law of conservation of momentum. We often observe how a balloon that is not closed from the end flies under the action of jet thrust. Movies often show the effect of damaging the faucet of a high-pressure gas cylinder: the cylinder flies around the room and destroys everything. Now imagine a large hole in the top of the NS-1 pipe at a pressure of 165 bar. The jet presses the pipe, which is well connected to the bottom for efficient transfer of elastic energy into the hard rock and excites seismic waves, which we register at large distances. The difference in the magnitude of the first source at NS-2 (pipe pressure 100 bar) and the source at NS-1 (pipe pressure 165 bar) is additional evidence for the possibility of such a mechanism.
Soon we will find out what led to the destruction of the pipes NS-1 and NS-2. The version of the explosion is less likely than technical sabotage, which led to instantaneous (under the action of internal pressure) and significant destruction of pipes. The absence of explosions better explains the observed pattern of the presence of seismic and infrasonic signals and the absence of hydroacoustic signals and tube waves.
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