7/18/11

Gasoline price in 2011

On December 21, 2010 we revisited the evolution of the price index of motor fuel (a component of the transportation consumer price index). It is time to test our predictions and make new projections.
 Here we follow our concept of deterministic and sustainable trends in the differences of consumer price indices. The model implies that the difference between the headline (or core) CPI and a given individual price index, iCPI,  can be described by a linear time function over time intervals of several years:

CPI(t) – iCPI(t) = A + Bt (1)
 where A and B are empirically estimated coefficients, and t is the elapsed time. Therefore, the “distance” between the CPI and the studied index is a linear function of time, with a positive or negative slope B. Free term A compensates the difference related to the start levels for a given year.
 On December 21, 2010 we presented Figure 1 and suggested that the difference reached some new trend and would follow it in the future. However, the evolution since January 2011 has been following another trajectory which resembles the fluctuation in 2008. We have already mentioned in this blog that the volatility in commodity prices has been extraordinary since 2005. This might be associated with speculative capital and/or quant funds. In any case, the swing in 2011 has come to its peak, as we expected a month ago, and not is returning to the trend. We expect the price index of motor fuel to grow at a lower rate than the headline CPI in order the difference to reach the trend by the end of 2011. In physical terms, the motor fuel price will likely be falling together with crude oil.
Figure 1. The difference between the headline CPI and the index for motor fuel. Solid diamonds represent the prediction given in March 2009 through December 2009. The total increase in the difference is +60 units of index or +35%: from 173 in March to 233 in December 2010. Dashed line represents the new trend, which is a mirror reflection to that between 2001 and 2008 shown by solid black line. In 2010, the difference has been fluctuating around the trend and thus should return to the trend in the beginning of 2011.
Figure 2. Same as in Figure 1with data through June 2011.

On the absence of structural unemployment in Canada

We have estimated a version of Okun’s law for the USA, France and Spain. As beforfe, we have apply a LSQ technique to the integral version of Okun’s law:


u(t) = u(t0) + bln[G/G0] + a(t-t0) (1)

where u(t) is the predicted rate of unemployment at time t, G is the level of real GDP per capita, a and b are empirical coefficients.

For Canada, we have estimated a similar model with a structural break somewhere between 1980 and 1990. The best-fit (dynamic) model minimizing the RMS error of the cumulative model (1) is as follows:

du = -0.28dlnG + 1.16, t<1983
du = -0.28dlnG + 0.30, t>1982 (2)

This model suggests no shift in the slope and a bigger change in the intercept around 1983. Figure 1 depicts the observed and predicted curves of the unemployment rate. The agreement is very good. Figure 2 shows that when the observed time series is regressed against the predicted one, R2=0.87. Here we do not test both time series for stationarity but presume that the rate of unemployment has to be a stationary time series in the long run.

The integral form of the dynamic Okun’s law (1) is characterized by a standard error of 0.68% for the period between 1971 and 2010. The average rate of unemployment for the same period is 8.2% with a standard deviation of the annual increment of 0.94%.

One can suggest that the rate of unemployment has been driven by real economic growth and there is no much room for structural unemployment.


Figure 1. The observed and predicted rate of unemployment in the Canada between 1970 and 2010.


Figure 2. The measured time series is regressed against the predicted one. R2=0.87 with both time series likely to be stationary.

7/17/11

When the rate of unemployment will fall to 5%? Likely never

Update: A working paper is available with more technical details.

The intuition behind Okun’s law is very simple.  Everybody can feel that the rate unemployment is likely to rise when real economic growth is very low or negative. An economy needs fewer employees to produce the same or smaller real GDP because of permanent productivity growth. Thus, Okun’s law describes quantitatively the negative correlation between real economic growth and the change in unemployment rate.

We have rewritten Okun’s law using the growth rate of real GDP per capita instead of GDP. For the USA we have already obtained the following empirical relationship:     

dw = -0.406dlnG + 1.113, t<1979
dw = -0.465dlnG + 0.866, t>1978     (1) 

where dw is the predicted annual increment in the rate of unemployment, dlnG=dG/G is the relative change rate of real GDP per capita per one year. By definition, for a discrete form of Okun’s law one has: dui=dwi+ei, where ei is the model residual error at discrete time i. We have estimated all coefficients and the beak year in (1) by minimizing the cumulative sum of ei squared.

In (1), the rate of real GDP growth has a threshold of (0.866/0.465=) 1.86% per year for the rate of unemployment to be constant. When dlnG is larger than 1.86% per year the rate of unemployment in the U.S. starts to decrease. Figure 1 displays the evolution of dlnG since 1979. On average, the rate of growth was 1.65% per year, i.e. slightly lower than the threshold and the rate of unemployment has been increasing since 1979.

Figure 1. dlnG as a function of time. Also shown is the threshold of 1.86% per year, the mean growth rate of 1.65% per year.            

When integrated between 1951 and t, equation (1) can be rewritten in the following form:
wt = 3.30.406ln[Gt/G1951] + 1.113(t-1951)  + c1  , t<1979
wt = w19780.465ln[Gt/G1978] + 0.866(t-1978)  + c2 ,  t>1978 (2)

where wt is the predicted rate of unemployment. The intercept c1=c2≡0, as is clear for t=t0.  Instead of using the continuous form (2), we calculate cumulative sums of the annual estimates of dlnG with appropriate initial conditions. By definition, the cumulative sum of the observdd du’s is the time series of the unemployment rate, ut. Figure 2 depicts the measured and observed curves. 

The agreement is excellent and has been obtained by a formal statistical method. The integral form of the dynamic Okun’s law (2), i.e. wt=f(lnGt), is characterized by a standard error of 0.55% for the period between 1951 and 2010. The average rate of unemployment for the same period is 5.75% with the average annual increment of 1.1%.  All in all, this is a very accurate model of unemployment. And this fact is the most intriguing one.

Figure 2.  The observed and predicted rate of unemployment in the USA between 1951 and 2010. 

Our empirical model suggests a tangible shift in the slope and a significant change in the intercept around 1979. This is a very important finding. There are two terms in (2) which define the evolution of the unemployment rate: real economic growth, as expressed by the relative change in real GDP per capita, counteracts the positive linear time trend. Figure 3 depicts both components. The difference or the distance between a(t-t0)  and –bln(Gt/G0)-u0 in Figure 3 is the rate of unemployment. 

The importance of the structural break in 1979 is obvious when we extend the trend a(t-t0)  observed before 1979. The distance would be much larger with the old trend after 1979, i.e. the rate of unemployment would have been also higher than that actually measured. If to extend the current time trend and the dependence on G through 2050 one can project the rate of unemployment as Figure 3 also depicts. Without a new structural break, the rate of unemployment in 2050 will be near 25%. This is grim news. It might happen that the U.S. is currently struggling through a transition to a new relation in (2) which will keep the rate of unemployment below 10%. In any case, the growth rate of real GDP per capita has to be much higher than 2% per year in order to reduce the current rate of unemployment to the level of 5%.  Such a rate is not expected in the near future. 

As an alternative, we have tried a logarithmic time trend instead of the linear one. The logarithmic trend easily follows from our model of economic growth which has an inertial component inversely proportional to the attained level of real GDP per capita:

dlnG/dt = 0.5dlnN9/dt + C/G (3)

where dlnN9/dt is the change rate of the number of 9-year-olds and C is an empirically estimated constant. The term C/G represents the inertial rate or growth, i.e. the rate of growth corresponding to no changes in the age pyramid.  Figure 4 demonstrates the observed evolution of G since 1950 and gives two projections: a linear one with an annual increment C=$591.5 and an exponential growth following the trend before 2010.  The deviation between these projections is fast and the next few years should distinguish between them. Figure 5 provides some examples of developed countries with linear trend in real GDP per capita. 

We have introduced a similar trend term in the original Okun’s law and obtained:

dw/dt  = A/Gt + bdlnG/dt  (4)

By integrating (4) one obtains

wt = u0 + bln[Gt/G0] + A∫dt/Gt  (5)

In the long run, the evolution of Gt is linear over time. Observations show that the change in the specific age population over the period of 50 and more years is negligibly small, ∫dlnN9/dt ~ 0. Then dlnG/Gdt=C/G and Gt=G0+C(t-t0). Therefore, both terms in (5) have a logarithmic trend in time and wt may vary around u0. For equation (2), these trends are different (linear and logarithmic) and wt must grow with time if there are no structural breaks. Figure 3 illustrates this divergence and the necessity of structural breaks. 

We have checked the predictive power of (5) relative to (2) and found no improvement. On the contrary, (5) does not allow to describe the whole period between 1951 and 2010 with one constant A.  Figure 6 depicts a model with A=28000 and b=-0.45. The model is very accurate between 1970 and 1990, overestimates the rate before 1970, and underestimates the observed rate after 2000. 

Figure 3. The evolution of two components in (2) defining the unemployment rate. 

Figure 4. The evolution of G over time with a projected linear trajectory for C=$591.5 and an exponential trajectory G=G0exp(0.0209t), where the exponent corresponds to that obtained for the period between 1950 and 2010.

Figure 5. Some examples of linear evolution of real GDP per capita in developed countries.

Figure 6. The observed rate of unemployment and that predicted by (5) with A=28000 and b=-0.45. 

There is a fundamental concern about the excellent performance of Okun’s law in the U.S. The rate of unemployment is measured as a portion of labor force with the fluctuating rate of participation.   This means that the sensitivity of unemployment to real economic growth, expressed by Okun’s law, does not depend on the rate of employment itself.  Figure 7 compares the change in the rate of employment (the employment/population ratio), e, and the rate of unemployment. These two variables have been evolving in sync. Before 1980, the change in the rate of unemployment is relatively higher. After 1980, their amplitudes are very close. 

Figure 7. The (negative) change in the rate of employment compared to the change in the rate of unemployment. 

We have estimated a model similar to Okun’s law for the employment/population ratio, e:

de = 0.277dlnG – 0.457, t<1983
de = 0.496dlnG – 0.87, t>1982     (6) 

Figure 8 compares the observed and predicted change in the employment/population ratio. Figure 9 shows the cumulative curves for the time series in Figure 8 and explains the structural break near 1982.  The employment/population ratio grew from ~57% in 1982 and ~63% in 1989. This break also explains a similar break in the unemployment rate near 1980. The change in slope in (2) and (6) is rather similar: both the rate of employment and unemployment is more sensitive to the rate of change in GDP. 

This is the effect we have already reported and modeled for the rate of participation in labor force, lt. To account for the effect of varying rate we introduced a factor, ft, exponentially depending on the difference between some reference rate, l0, and current rate, lt: ft=f0exp[g(lt-l0)], where f0  and g are empirical constants. The intuition behind the model is simple. The employment/population ratio and thus labor force increases with real GDP. When the rate of labor force participation undergoes a, say, 1% increase almost all new employees enter the workforce at the level of marginal personal income. Observations show that personal incomes are distributed exponentially in the low income range, i.e. the number of people with a given income decreases exponentially with increasing income. Accordingly, the input of the newcomers into the increasing GDP decreases exponentially with increasing labor force.  Thus, the sensitivity of employment/population ratio to real GDP increases with the ratio.   

This factor should be applied to Okun’s law as well. We will address this topic in the next post on employment. 

Figure 8. The observed and predicted change in the employment/population ratio, de.

Figure 9. The cumulative curves for the observed and predicted change in the employment/population ratio, de.

Food price. Quarterly update

This is a quarterly update. We continue reporting on the evolution of the difference between core CPI and the index for food (beverages not included). In several previous posts we confirmed that this difference had been following a long-term (negative) quasi-linear trend since 2001.  There is no important change so far.

In 2008, the trend line was much steeper than predicted and crossed the zero line. In the beginning of 2009, the trend reached the bottom and turned to a positive one, although not for long. The growth in food prices restarted in 2010 and has been in place since.
In June 2011, the trend (black) line crosses the zero line in the end of 2010. Therefore, Figure 1 demonstrates that the difference between the core CPI and the index of food has been slowly approaching to its original trend (red line) since 2009.

Here we suggest that the intercept with the zero line and the pivot to the decreasing food price may start any time in 2011 or 2012 depending on the bottom (resistance) level. Since the previous negative/positive pivot was at the level of -10, as displayed in Figure 2, one cannot exclude that the negative trend may change only after 2016. This case is less likely, however.

Figure 1. The difference between the core CPI and the price index of food. The pivot point to a positive trend is likely in 2011 or 2012.

Figure 2. The difference between the core CPI and the price index of food between 1960 and June 2011.

Housing price index. Quarterly update

This is a quarterly update. The housing index comprises approximately a half of the headline CPI. Three months ago we reported that the price index of housing had been decreasing since the end of 2008 relative to the overall CPI. In May 2011, the difference reached its peak and showed a slight decrease. In June, the difference fell by 0.6 points. This makes May 2011 a pivot point in the behavior of the housing index relative to the CPI. The latter fell by 0.5 in June while the housing index grew by 0.13, with the average increment during the past 12 months of 0.23.  Therefore, the housing index is not accelerating and the turn in the difference is caused by the fall in energy price and in the headline CPI, as we predicted in April 2011.  
The Figure 1 displays the difference between the CPI and the housing index (both are seasonally adjusted) as reported by the BLS on July 15, 2011.  The current trend is negative, i.e. the CPI grows slower than the index of housing. Due to the leading role of energy in the current decrease of the CPI, the housing index will demonstrate a faster growth (or slower fall) than the CPI through 2011 and the difference in Figure 1 will likely approach the zero line.

Figure 1. The change in the trend started in 2009.  After the turn in May 2011, the current trend is negative, i.e. the CPI grows slower than the index of housing.

CPI and core CPI. Quarterly update

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has reported the estimates of various consumer price indices for June 2011. According to our quarterly schedule, we have to revisit the difference between the headline and core CPI in July 2011. As expected, these new estimates reveal a crucial turn in the difference. After 10 consecutive months of fall, the difference started to grow.  This turn manifests the beginning of a new period leading to price deflation in 2012. We expect the rate of consumer price inflation to fall below zero somewhere in 2012.  

Figures 1 and 2 briefly repeat our concept of sustainable (quasi-linear) long-term trends in the difference between the headline and core CPI in the U.S. There were two clear periods of linear behaviour: between 1981 and 1999 and between 2002 and 2009. A natural assumption of the future evolution of the difference was that a new trend has to emerge around 2010 after a short period of very high volatility. (However, the difference is very volatile also in 2011.  There is no sign that the higher volatility will calm down any time soon.)

Figure 1. Linear regression of the difference between the core CPI and CPI for the period from 1981 to 1999 (R2=0.96, the slope is 0.67) and a regression of the difference between the core CPI and CPI between 2002 and 2009 (R2=0.91 and the slope is -1.59). 

Accordingly, Figure 2 illustrates this hypothesis with the reversion (like mirror reflection) of the trend between 2002 and 2009. We expected this new trend with a positive slope to be developed between 2008 and 2011, as shown by the solid red line. Against our early expectations, after a year of “right” evolution in 2010 the difference fell to the zero line again in 2011. After a slight growth in May 2011, which we discussed a month ago, the difference made a large step up in June 2011. Hence, May 2011 was a pivot point for the difference and it will likely be approaching the trend through the end of 2011.

Figure 2. The evolution of the difference between the core and headline CPI since 2002.

Figure 3 depicts the most recent period with the turn in May 2011. It is not excluded that the difference will return to the long-term trend by the end of 2011. This return should be accompanied by a remarkable drop in the index price of energy which was the driver of the headline CPI in the first quarter of 2011.  As a result, oil price will be falling in 2011 and food price will likely grow at a very low pace if grow at all. We are preparing some updates for the difference between the price index of energy and the core CPI.

Figure 3. The evolution of the difference between the core and headline CPI since 2010.

U.S. collapse?

This is to summarize some recent and older posts. In 2012, our models show:

1.     Recession
2.     Deflation
3.     Low employment/population rate
4.     High unemployment rate
5.     Increasing income inequality

Without hesitation one can add:
1.     Three wars for the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
2.     Threat of  new wars
3.     Budget deficit and the possibility of a technical default
4     Presidential election

Drang nach Osten — «натиск на Восток»

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